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Effect of Financial Incentives to Physicians, Patients, or Both on Lipid Levels: A
Randomized Clinical Trial
Abstract
Can financial incentives be used to reduce cholesterol levels in high-risk patients? This randomized trial
says modest reductions can be achieved only by targeting incentives to both patients and physicians, not
to one or the other.
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KEY FINDINGS:
Can financial incentives be used to reduce cholesterol levels in high-risk patients? This randomized trial says modest
reductions can be achieved only by targeting incentives to both patients and physicians, not to one or the other.

THE QUESTION
To whom should financial incentives be targeted to achieve
a desired clinical or health outcome? Physician and patient
incentives are becoming more common, but they are rarely
combined, and effectiveness of these approaches is not
well-established. Using insight from behavioral economics,
a research team led by LDI Senior Fellows David Asch
and Kevin Volpp sought to determine whether physician
financial incentives, patient incentives, or shared physician
and patient incentives are more effective in promoting
medication adherence and reducing cholesterol levels of
patients at high risk for cardiovascular disease.

THE STUDY
The researchers randomly assigned 340 primary care
physicians (PCPs) from three large primary care practices in
the northeastern United States to one of four study groups:
control, physician incentives, patient incentives, and shared
physician-patient incentives. More than 1,500 patients, all
at high risk of cardiovascular disease, participated and were
allocated to the same group as their PCP.
Patients received their prescribed daily dose of statins in
an electronic pill bottle, which, when opened, wirelessly
transmitted a signal to a web platform.

Each patient in the three intervention groups was assigned
a quarterly goal to reduce lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C)
levels, which should have been achievable if the patient was
fully adherent to his or her prescribed medication.
PCPs in the physician incentives group accrued quarterly
payments of $256 for each enrolled patient who met the
quarterly goal, paid semi-annually. PCPs in the patient
incentives group received no payments; instead, their
patients participated in an automatic daily lottery with
eligibility based on having taken the statin the day before.
PCPs and patients in the shared incentives group followed
the same incentive structure as in the PCP or patient-specific
groups but with payments of half the size. Total possible
payouts were the same for all incentive groups. Physicians
and patients in the control group received no goal-based
incentives, but all participants received small participation
payments. The interventions continued for 12 months, and
patients were followed up for an additional three months.

THE FINDINGS
Only patients in the shared physician-patient incentives
group achieved reductions in LDL-C levels statistically
different from those in the control group.
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of medication by PCPs and patient adherence to that
medication.

Source: JAMA. 2015;314(18):1926-1935. doi:10.1001/jama.2015.14850
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After 12 months of the intervention, 49% of patients in the
shared physician-patient incentives group had achieved their
LDL-C goal compared with 40% in physician incentives,
40% in patient incentives, and 36% in control.
Although medication adherence was higher in the shared
incentive and patient incentive groups, it was low across
all the groups. However, patients who were already
taking statins before the start of the study (less than half
of participants) showed large increases in adherence with
incentives. This suggests that the incentive was ineffective
in promoting initiation of statin use in patients but effective
in increasing adherence among those already taking statins.

THE IMPLICATIONS

This trial is the first of its kind to thoroughly test physician,
patient, and shared incentives of equivalent value, and is
notable for incorporating several insights from behavioral
economics: daily engagement, “regret” lotteries, a relatively
high probability of a small reward and lower probability of a
larger reward, and leveraging of loss aversion.
These findings are important for what they reveal about
what works and what does not work. Neither physician
nor patient incentives on their own lowered the LDL-C
level significantly more than the control. The lack of
effect of the physician-only intervention offers the first
controlled evidence that adding these incentives to a feefor-service payment model may not improve medicationrelated intermediate outcomes. The authors suggest that the
effectiveness of the shared incentives model makes sense
with the LDL-C reduction likely driven by both provision
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While the study points to the incentive structure that had
the greatest relative impact, the improvements were modest
and the authors stress that further information is needed to
understand whether the approach represents good value.
Further, one limitation of the study was a lack of a true
“usual-care” control that did not receive electronic pill bottles.
Patients in the control group received electronic pill bottles
and may have been more adherent than is typical because they
were under observation. Other limitations include a relatively
small number of enrolled patients per physician, which limited
the potential rewards for physicians and may have reduced
their motivation to go after these awards.
Asch DA, Troxel AB, Stewart WF, et al. Effect of Financial Incentives to
Physicians, Patients, or Both on Lipid Levels: A Randomized Clinical Trial.
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